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On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation and
Freedom of Expression and Privacy
Katherine S. Williams*
I. Introduction
Life brings with it opportunities and risks, as do freedoms, rights
and most major advances in civilization and technology. Each is both a
blessing and a curse. In all cases it is essential to ascertain the essence of
the positive aspect and protect it, knowing that this will always permit
some negative or risky elements to survive. So it is with the Internet. In
order to preserve the Internet's enormous potential to deliver freedom of
expression, it is necessary to accept, or decide how to deal with, the
potential harms that arise. The difficulty is always determining where,
how and why to draw the line that curtails some expression, or some
other right, by criminalizing activities or by blocking or otherwise
preventing certain types of speech. This paper discusses one issue,
anonymity on the net, and considers why it is so attractive and yet so
potentially risky. Whilst mention will be made of legal and human rights
elements, the focus is on the sociological and psychological attractions of
anonymity. Issues to be addressed include whether anonymity causes
unacceptable behaviours; why some use anonymity to gain an advantage,
often an unacceptable advantage; and what this might mean for control
of the net or other social or legal interventions.
II. Rights and Dangers Associated with On-line Anonymity
Those concerned with human rights and civil liberties consider
anonymity on the web to be an important tool in guaranteeing freedom of
expression. Anonymity permits individuals to profess their interests,
beliefs and political ideologies without fear of reprisals from the state or
any other powerful organisation. It also permits others to receive these
views, an important aspect of many Human Rights instruments. For
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example, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
The right set out in the ECHR not only protects ones ability to
impart and receive expression but also protects an international or cross-
border dimension for those activities. Interference with anonymity
would affect each of these aspects of the right. Furthermore, at its first
opportunity, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) declared that
freedom of expression covers unpopular as well as popular ideas:
Freedom of expression.., is applicable not only to "information" or
"ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb
the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
"democratic society."
'2
Clearly, it would be a gross violation of the right of expression to curtail
or otherwise interfere with the use of anonymity without a sound reason
for the interference.
As well as protecting freedom of expression, anonymity also
protects the privacy of the individual by preserving his/her identity, as
guaranteed in Article 8(1) of the ECHR 3 which refers to respect for
private and family life. The Court has adopted a broad interpretation of
private and family life to include not only the notion of the "inner circle,"
but also "to a certain degree the right to establish and develop
relationships with human beings. '" Establishing and developing
relationships must include the boundaries of those relationships, thus
permitting privacy and anonymity. Interestingly, due to the impersonal
nature of contact on the Internet, all of the normal safeguards as to whom
one is dealing with are absent. In the real world, if I meet someone in
person, I can form my own assessment of many of that person's traits,
however erroneous or prejudiced that may be. In the virtual world, this
1. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 10, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
2. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 754-55 (1976).
3. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8. "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence." Id.
4. Niemetz v. Germany, App. No. 251-B, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).
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is not possible, and individuals are free to alter their sex, age, race,
religion, status, etc.-in effect re-inventing themselves, physically,
psychologically and socially. They can invent numerous personae for
use in different situations or to give them different possibilities in the
same sector of the net. Their new personae may help them to become
empowered in a way that they feel is not possible in the real world.
Fantasy, games, whistle blowing, and the provision and enjoyment of
counselling or help and advice on the net, especially in areas such as
mental health which is so stigmatised in the community, may all be
enhanced by anonymity and may in turn enhance the lives of the users
and possibly also of others. Anonymity therefore serves two important
rights.
Unfortunately, anonymity also brings great risks-it facilitates the
commission of crimes, torts and other harmful, anti-social or deviant
activities with impunity. Individuals can libel others, damage
companies, damage economies, destabilise regimes, disseminate hate
speech, prey on children or other vulnerable individuals, and disseminate
criminal or offensive information or images. Governments fear the
possibility of individuals being strongly persuaded politically by
information in the virtual community. This fear is heightened because
the World Wide Web can also provide the information necessary to
subvert the state or to conduct terrorism, such as political information or
propaganda and bomb making instructions, thus providing both the
ideology and practical information necessary to destabilise a regime.
Governments prefer to have some control on information. Particularly in
our information era, political power and authority is heavily interwoven
with the dissemination of- information (or the control of its
dissemination). This interweaving of ,power and information or
knowledge is not new and was the reason for the early control of the
printing press through licensing 5 and the use of seditious libel.
Anonymity for those disseminating information to a mass audience is
therefore always of concern.
Interestingly, as well as these often-discussed polarised possibilities,
anonymity on the Internet has other potentially positive effects and great
positive potential. In some circumstances, anonymity helps to protect
against certain risks. For example, one of the greatest protections from
predators on the net is anonymity because it allows children and other
vulnerable individuals to remain anonymous, particularly in on-line chat
rooms. Children need to be educated about the reasons for protecting
their anonymity and the dangers inherent in failure to do so. Children
5. See S.J. Lewis, An Instrument of the New Constitution: The Origins of the
General Warrant, 7 J. LEGAL HIST. 256-72 (1986).
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should be advised to protect their identities and their personal
information in on-line chat rooms in case those they are chatting with are
very different from the personae they project on-line.6 This protection
can be enhanced by use of encryption, anonymous remailers and other
privacy devises. However, the most dangerous aspect of chat rooms is
the fact that children often choose to reveal their identities and locations
to those they feel they can trust, usually someone they feel they have
"got to know" in the chat room. According to the Cyberspace Research
Unit, one in ten young chat users will attend a face-to-face meeting with
another chat user, and three quarters of these will not take an adult.7 The
Research Unit also found young users did not understand how, when or
why to retain anonymity or how to protect themselves in the
environment. Neither schools nor parents were doing enough to educate
children about this medium or about other new communications media.8
If anonymity is attacked, criminalised or portrayed as unacceptable, this
situation is likely to get far worse because the law abiding will obey
whilst those intent on criminal behaviour will continue to abuse
anonymity.
There are strong positive reasons to support anonymity in the cyber
world, which include protecting the rights to freedom of expression and
privacy and protecting the vulnerable. As suggested by Rowland, 9 there
is a need for a clear risk assessment concerning the use and abuse of
anonymity on the net to ascertain how great a problem it really represents
and whether the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
This piece does not purport to fill this gap in research but does
assess whether anonymity is really the problem. It also questions
whether anonymity causes people to transgress on the net or merely frees
them as in other non-computer based situations and asks why this
activity has not proven to be as prevalent or problematic as was
expected.
6. CYBERSPACE RESEARCH UNIT, YOUNG PEOPLES USE OF CHAT ROOMS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMS OF EDUCATION (2002),
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/facs/science/psychol/Homeoff2.pdf.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 2-5.
9. Diane Rowland, Anonymity, Privacy and Cyberspace, BRITISH & IRISH LAW,
EDUC. AND TECH. ASS'N CONFERENCE: ELEC. DATASETS AND ACCESS TO LEGAL INFO.
(2000), http://www.bileta.ac.uk/pages/Conference%20Papers.aspx [hereinafter Rowland,
Anonymity]. See also Diane Rowland, Privacy, Freedom of Expression and
CyberSLAPPs: Fostering Anonymity on the Internet?, BRITISH & IRISH LAW, EDUC. AND
TECH. ASS'N CONFERENCE: INFO. IN THE ONLINE ENV'T (2003), http://www.bileta.ac.uk/
pages/Conference%20Papers.aspx [hereinafter Rowland, Privacy].
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III. Deindividuation and Anonymity
It has been suggested that work on deindividuation l° might explain
the link between anonymity and unacceptable or anti-social activities on-
line. Deindividuation is a social psychological theory; its origins
concerned the behaviour of individuals in crowds. It sought to explain
the transformation of an apparently rational and responsible individual
into an unruly and irresponsible person. The essence of the theory is that
inner restraints are lost when people are no longer seen or considered as
individuals." The early defining aspects of the phenomenon, and the
ones which people intuitively feel will release individuals to offend on
the net, are that an individual: (1) joins a group or crowd; (2) enjoys a
sense of being submerged or subsumed and anonymous; (3) suffers from
a loss of self-awareness; 12 and (4) feels a diffuse responsibility and is
thereby more open to suggestions. In the early theory as set out by Le
Bon, 13 these suggestions came from the group, and the individual was on
a moral or ethical holiday during which the morals of the mass or group
could be substituted for those generally used or enjoyed by the
individual-basically, the individual is not him/herself whilst in the
group. 14 Instead, he or she is part of a larger and different whole, a
puppet of the group or its leader. The ability of the individual to regulate
his/her own behaviour is weakened, as is the ability to conduct rational
and long-term planning. There is therefore a tendency to react to
situations quickly without considering all the consequences and to give
little thought to the way others might view the behaviour, all of which
tends to give rise to impulsive and unrestrained behaviour. This theory
has been used to explain various collective behaviours, like violent
crowds and lynch mobs, and has also been linked to other criminal and
deviant 15 activities such as stealing, violence and aggressive driving.
16
Although early links were to the group, many modern theorists have
10. GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND (Transaction
Publishers 1995) (1895).
11. L. Festinger et al., Some Consequences of Deindividuation in a Group, 47 J.
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 382-390 (1952).
12. Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order
Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, 17 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 237 (W.T.
Arnold & D. Levine eds., Univ. of Neb. Press 1969).
13. LEBON, supra note 10.
14. This would explain the classic Stanford Prison Experiment. For more
information, see Philip G. Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of
the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University (2005),
http://www.prisonexp.org/.
15. See Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking your Mind: Defamation
and Free Expression on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519 (2006).
16. P. Ellison et al., Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behaviour: A Field Study, 10
J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 256 (1995).
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linked deindividuation to anonymity-those who believe that their
identity is unknown will behave in this same impulsive and unrestrained
manner. 17  Ellison et al.18 linked the anonymity of drivers to their
behaviour behind the wheel; Zimbardo' 9 showed that people were more
likely to administer a stronger electric shock when they were hooded and
therefore unknown.
Deindividuation has also been associated with other phenomena
such as genocide and with disinhibition in other settings such as
computer mediated communication. To assess its utility as an
explanation in the last area, it is necessary to analyse the recent
explanations for deindividuation which have moved away from reliance
solely, or even largely, on anonymity towards contextual factors such as
reduction of responsibility, arousal, sensory overload, a lack of
contextual structure or predictability and even the effects of various
substances. 20  The connection of deindividuation to these different
contextual factors was not the only change to the theory. The need for
the physical presence of the group or crowd was also dispensed with so
that loss of individuality might result in other contexts and could itself
lead to a loss of control. This means that moral restraints would no
longer hold the individual, allowing him or her to participate in
impulsive, emotional, irrational, regressive and intense behaviour some
of which is likely to be unacceptable to others. The part played by
anonymity is currently thought to be substantially reduced, and the link
now is with reduced self-awareness which decreases the possibility of
self-regulation, thus giving rise to the anti-normative and disinhibited
behaviours traditionally linked to deindividuation. However, the links
between deindividuation and this negative behaviour have not been born
out in empirical studies. Even Zimbardo 2t noted that his findings were
not predictable or always supportive of the theory, and in a meta-analysis
of sixty tests of the theory, Postmes and Spears 22 found insufficient
support for it.
In this environment there has been a further shift in the theory to
what is called the Social Identity Theory of Deindividuation (SIDE).
17. See, e.g., id.; Tom Postmes & Russell Spears, Deindividuation and
Antinormative Behaviour: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCH. BULL. 238 (1998); Zimbardo,
supra note 12.
18. Ellison, supra note 16.
19. Zimbardo, supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Postmes & Spears, supra note 17.
23. Stephen D. Reicher, Crowd Behaviour as Social Action, in JOHN C. TURNER ET
AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY (Oxford
Blackwell 1987). See also Stephen Reicher et al., A Social Identity Model of
[Vol. 110:3
ON-LINE ANONYMITY
Within this theory, anonymity has been considered too simple a frame of
reference. Instead, the self is considered to be a complex construct
consisting of at least two subsystems: (1) personal identity-the
qualities that make an individual who he or she is and how he or she is
different from others; and (2) social identity or identities-the groups the
individual belongs to and the identity which comes to the fore when the
individual is in a particular group. SIDE links deindividuation not with
anti-normative or unruly behaviour but rather with a shift from individual
towards group or social frames of reference and norms which are shared
by others. These frames of reference may be anti- or pro-normative,
depending on the group ethics. This still means that behaviour is
dominated by external cues, rather than internal standards, but respects
that often those cues are more controlled than the individual might be
and may vary depending on the group and its normative structures or
expectations. This still retains the essence of the theory as behaviour
which occurs without, or with reduced dependence on, internal or wider
social references. The theory is also still linked to anonymity as the
effects of movement from internal to social or group frames of reference
are more likely to occur and to be more marked depending upon the
presence or absence of anonymity.
IV. Is Anonymity Linked either Causally or Otherwise to Unacceptable
Behaviour on the Net?
In early associations of deindividuation with computers, the
argument went that whilst using computers many felt anonymous-they
were not physically overlooked and viewed their virtual world as
separate from their real world. This meant that whilst on the computer
people did not feel constrained by either normal internal or social
inhibitors. They were morally and ethically liberated to behave as they
chose.2 4 Many argued that this meant that computer users would
transgress normal boundaries on a regular basis and that normally law-
abiding, caring and moral individuals would be liberated from their
internal morals or ethics and would begin to behave badly, rudely,
insensitively and maybe even criminally. Within this early work it is
often unclear whether the unacceptable or harmful behaviours were
linked to groups, to anonymity, to the medium of communication (a
computer), to the effect of not communicating directly with a real person
which removes the need to take their feelings into consideration and can
result in a failure to think of the other person as human, to an absorption
Deindividuation Phenomena, 6 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 161 (1995).
24. Jonathan Siegel et al., Group Processes in Computer-Mediated Communication,
37 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157 (1986).
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with or a type of addiction to the media and a resulting inability to
consider other things, to a reduction of inhibitions more generally, or to
some other factor. The question as to whether it was the medium (the
computer) or some other facet which was linked to the behavioural
changes was difficult to resolve. Some work2 5 has suggested that both
the computer-based medium and the anonymity can have a marked effect
on behaviour, leading to less traditional behaviours. Cooper's2 6 study
analysed individuals in a brainstorming session. The research concluded
that the link was with more controversial, though often useful, solutions
in a brainstorming session. Some of these solutions were so offensive as
to cause others in the brainstorming session to withdraw. However,
when tested, results generally have not shown such a marked effect.
They have not backed up general deindividuation theory as an
explanation for on-line transgressions.27 This is less surprising when one
considers that the researchers did not take account of SIDE.
As mentioned above, recently the SIDE model of deindividuation
has become more influential as the explanation of how groups affect
behaviour. This model has been applied to computer-mediated
communication and has uncovered more consistent support for
deindividuation as espoused in SIDE. Therefore, behaviours mediated
by the group or social self rather than the private self come to the fore in
these on-line group discussions. Where the group tends toward
damaging or generally unacceptable behaviours, these are replicated by
members of the on-line group,28 but where the group dynamics tend
towards polite or other ethical behaviours, these behaviours are just as
likely to be replicated by group members. In these pieces of research,
the effects of anonymity were found to depend on a number of factors
such as the salience of the group membership to the individual and to the
group and the social context of the interaction. So, anonymity and, in
particular, dissociation with the physical attributes of other members (not
25. William H. Cooper et al., Some Liberating Effects of Anonymous Electronic
Brainstorming, 29 RES. 147 (1998).
26. Id.
27. Joseph S. Valacich et al., Group Size and Anonymity Effects on Computer-
Mediated Idea Generation, 23 SMALL GROUP RES. 49 (1992). See also K.E. Greenwood,
Deindividuation v. Individuation on the Computer, 27 INT'L J. OF PSYCHOL. 305 (1992).
28. Karen M. Douglas & Craig McGarty, Identifiability and Self-Presentation:
Computer-Mediated Communication and Intergroup Interaction, 40 BRIT. J. OF Soc.
PSYCHOL. 399 (2001). See also Russell Spears & Martin Lea, Social Influence and the
Influence of the 'Social' in Computer-Mediated Communication, in CONTEXTS OF
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION (Martin Lea ed., 1992); Karen M. Douglas &
Craig McGarty, Internet Identifiability and Beyond: A Model of the Effects of
Identifiability on Communicative Behaviour, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 17 (2002); Martin Lea
& Russell Spears, Computer-Mediated Communication, Deindividuation and Group
Decision-Making, 34 INT'L J. OF MAN-MACHINE STUD. 283 (1991).
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being able to "see" them) does not necessarily lead to bad behaviour
unless that behaviour is encouraged by the group or is part of its being.
Groups with pro-social norms can increase the tendency for people to act
in accordance with those positive social norms. The power, influence
and limits of the group over norms of behaviour was illustrated by
Postmes et al., 29 who discovered that in-group communication (both
content and form) was governed by group norms. Adherence to these
group norms increased over time as the individual became socialised into
that group, but these group norms were limited to the boundaries of the
group, and therefore communication outside the group was governed by
other social norms. Furthermore, the group effects were found to be
amplified in a depersonalised or anonymous environment, where group
members were not known to each other, or were only known by
pseudonyms. 30 Although the effects of the medium and anonymity may
also be heavily affected by national culture/identity, the effects of each,
and the way in which they interact, need to be further studied.3'
Another aspect of deindividuation theory which is of interest is that
of Reicher's recent work32 showing that the effects of deindividuation are
strongest when the in-group are visible to one another. This may suggest
anonymity reduces the effects of deindividuation; however, the increased
effect of in-group visibility was equally strong even when the visibility
that people believed they had was with an invented persona. Barrero and
Ellemers33 found interesting results when they studied anonymity within
the group. They found that deindividuation measured by the willingness
of the individual to conform to and work for the group was strongest
when the individuals were either totally anonymous or totally visible to
the in-group. Between these extreme states group effects were lower.
Reicher et al.34 also found that generally the effects of SIDE are
strengthened where the group has to overcome out-group repression in
order to express its defining nature. The effects of repression and
internal cohesion emphasise the group frames of reference. Therefore,
29. Tom Postmes et al., The Formation of group norms in computer-mediated
communication, 26 HUMAN COMM. REs. 341 (2000).
30. Tom Postmes et al., Intergroup Differentiation in Computer-Mediated
Communication: Effects of Depersonalization, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 3 (2002).
31. Bruce A. Reinig & Roberto J. Mejias, The Effects of National Culture and
Anonymity on Flaming and Criticalness in GSS-Supported Discussions, 35 SMALL GROUP
REs. 698 (2004).
32. S. Reicher et al., More on Deindividuation, Power Relations Between Groups
and the Expression of Social Identity: Three Studies on the Effects of Visibility to the In-
Group, 37 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 15 (1998).
33. Manuela Barrero & Naomi Ellemers, The Impact of Anonymity and Group
Identification on Progroup Behavior in Computer-Mediated Groups, 33 SMALL GROUP
REs. 590 (2002).
34. Reicher, supra note 32.
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behaviours consistent with these rather than with personal internal or
wider social controls are likely to arise.35 This has been at least partially
replicated in the on-line world where the need to resist a powerful out-
group intensified the capacity for resistance.36 For our purposes, the
work by Spears et al. is even more revealing.37  They argue that
computer communication is not substantially different from face-to-face
communication. In fact they claim that in group situations such as chat
rooms, newsgroups etc., the impetus to conform may be stronger than in
face-to-face interactions.
The effects of aspects like anonymity and deindividuation in the on-
line environment must never be exaggerated. Though when using SIDE
both anonymity and computers seem to have an effect, this effect is
unlikely to be greater than it would be for similar media under similar
conditions. Hobman38 suggests that the immediate effects in the on-line
environment may be amplified and greater than those in other
environments (face-to-face) but that these differences ironed themselves
out very quickly, over a few days.
All in all, neither anonymity nor the on-line environment (nor their
combination) per se can be said to cause unacceptable or criminal
behaviours any more than is the case in the real world. Clearly, however,
anonymity is sensibly and rationally chosen by those who decide to
perform negative activities, whether criminal or other, and who do not
wish to be held to account for those activities. Therefore, although
anonymity is likely to be used in terrorist cells or in child pornography
rings, it does not cause people to become involved in such activities. In
these settings the anonymity and reduced self-awareness which give rise
to deindividuation may be connected with the activity. For example,
they possibly facilitate the activity and clearly render it easier to take part
in the activity with impunity by making detection more difficult.
However, and crucially, these aspects are not causative; neither
anonymity nor even deindividuation itself explains the causes of
computer-related criminality or other harmful uses of computing.
35. Id. See also S. Reicher & R. M. Levine, Deindividuation, Power Relations
Between Groups and the Expression of Social Identity: The Effects of Visibility to the
Out-group, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 (1994); S. Reicher & R. M. Levine, On the
Consequences of Deindividuation Manipulations for the strategic Communication of Self:
Identifiability and the Presentation of Social Identity, 24 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 511-524
(1994).
36. Russell Spears, et al., Computer-mediated Communication as a Channel for
Social Resistance: The Strategic Side of SIDE, 33 SMALL GROUP RES. 555 (2002).
37. Russell Spears, et al., When are the Net Effects Gross Products? The Power of
Influence and the Influence of Power in Computer-Mediated Communication, 55 J Soc.
Iss. 91 (2002).
38. Elizabeth V. Hobman et al., The Expression of Conflict in Computer-Mediated
and Face-to-Face Groups, 33 SMALL GROUP RES. 439 (2002).
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Anonymity and deindividuation provide no magic solution concerning
why these activities arise, although they do help to explain how
individuals become more and more drawn into the group mores and how
these can overcome either individual norms of behaviour or wider social
mores. This effect is linked not to anonymity but to deindividuation,
especially as espoused through SIDE, and therefore is related to the
complex interaction of personal identity with social identity or identities
in an on-line environment. It is the power of the group that has the effect
not the anonymity. Therefore, although intuitively we may think that
anonymity causes the bad behaviour, this is not the case. The most
anonymity may be doing is impeding detection and thereby allowing
people to choose negative activities. In this situation controlling
anonymity would only reduce the amount of criminal or unacceptable
behaviour on-line to the extent to which it facilitated, or was believed to
facilitate, detection. It is perfectly possible that individuals commit
negative activities believing they will go un-punished. This may happen
with or without anonymity. To control criminal activities on the net, it is
necessary to search elsewhere for causative explanations of the
behaviour and/or to increase detection rates. We must consider whether
the potential increase in detection rates is enough to warrant interference
with on-line anonymity.
V. Is Control of or Curtailing of Anonymity Compatible with
Protection of Human Rights?
Under the ECHR both freedom of expression (Article 10) and
privacy (Article 8) are limited in specific instances. The second
paragraph of each of these articles permits interference by a public
authority with the rights set out in the first paragraphs. 39 Article 8(2)
defines the circumstances in which the rights may be interfered with as
follows:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
40
Article 10(2) defines the circumstances in which the rights may be
interfered with as follows:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
39. See supra note 1 for article 10(1) and supra note 3 for article 8(1).
40. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8.
2006]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary.
41
In brief each right may be interfered with if:
i. interference is in accordance with the law, as clearly set out in
statute or case law;
ii. the restriction serves one of the legitimate aims set out in the
second paragraph's exhaustive list, and;
iii.the interference is necessary in a democratic society.
Only exceptions set out in the second paragraph of each article will be
accepted as legitimate reasons to interfere with that right. Each list is
exhaustive and is to be narrowly construed so that states cannot extend
interpretation of the provisions beyond their ordinary language.
If controls on, or restrictions of, anonymity were set out in statute
law, the first element would be met. In each case most of the dangers
often associated with anonymity on-line would be covered, or appear to
be covered, by the permitted aims set out in each of the second
paragraphs. For example, states might claim that restrictions on
anonymity would serve the interests of national security (or, in the case
of Article 10, territorial integrity), the prevention of disorder or crime, or,
in the case of expression under Article 10, the protection of the
reputation or rights of others. The real issue concerns the third prong of
the test justifying interference with a right, which asks whether that
interference would be necessary in a democratic society. For a
restriction to be necessary, it should be directed to meeting a "pressing
social need," and it should be proportionate to that need.42
Proportionality is assessed by asking whether the interference with the
right is more extensive than is justified by the legitimate aim. The
balance, therefore, is between the extent and nature of the interference
and the reasons that justify it, rather than directly between the
interference and the right. Wherever possible, the state must achieve the
legitimate aim by the least intrusive means. The court (ECHR) takes
41. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 10.
42. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979)




account of factors such as whether the right is sufficiently important to
warrant the requirement of a particularly strong reason for any
interference and whether the interference is so drastic that it deprives the
right-holder of the very essence of the right. Importantly, the court also
inquires into whether the harm caused to the right-holder is potentially
outweighed by any benefit which the interference might achieve through
furthering the legitimate aim. The court permits the state a "margin of
appreciation" in assessing both the existence of a pressing social need
and the appropriate response which should be taken to deal with it. This
leeway for discretionary judgment is permitted because it is thought that
national authorities are in a better position than is an international
tribunal to judge what is necessary within their own state. The discretion
is limited and ultimately the European Court of Human Rights will
decide whether there is a pressing social need and whether the limitation
is proportional to that need. Therefore, the state has to be able to prove:
that there is a need for any restriction; that the measures taken will meet
that need; that the standards used by the local authorities conform with
the ECHR; and that all of the state's actions can legitimately be
considered proportionate.
From this it is clear that it is important to take account of how great
an interference there is with the interests being protected. Anonymity is
used to allow individuals to express beliefs and political ideologies
without fear of reprisals from states. To interfere with rights to
anonymity would therefore severely impair individuals' rights to
freedom of expression in areas of important political and other belief.
Interference with anonymity would also impede the ability of individuals
to make known to others the persona by which they wish to be known or
to limit the amount of information about themselves to which others on-
line are permitted access. Each of these is an important interference with
the right guaranteed under the ECHR. As control of, or limitation of,
anonymity may interfere with the content of material expressed on-line,
it goes to the very essence of the right and therefore requires strong
justifications in order to interfere with it. The previous section suggested
that there was no proven causal link between anonymity per se and the
negative behaviours generally associated with computers. For this
reason interference with anonymity would be unlikely to protect against
harmful or criminal behaviours occurring on the net. The most
interference would achieve would be facilitating law-enforcement
officers in investigating and prosecuting any criminal transgressions
and/or facilitating civil actions. Therefore, whilst there is a pressing
social need both to prevent criminal activity being conducted on-line and
to protect national security, the schism between anonymity and any
causal link to criminality or unacceptable behaviour means that general
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interference with rights to anonymity would be unlikely to reduce
criminal activity or prevent any threats to national security. Instead,
interference would prevent individuals from expressing themselves and
their beliefs. The aim of prevention is legitimate and, if achievable,
might justify control of anonymity. However, because the benefit which
might be achieved through furthering the legitimate aim would be small
and the harm to some right-holders would be great, blanket or general
interference with anonymity would not be justified. The harm caused to
the right-holder is not outweighed by any benefit which the interference
might achieve through furthering the legitimate aim.
If interference with anonymity cannot be justified on the preventive
grounds, is it possible to justify such measures in order to aid in the
detection and prosecution of individuals who use the veil of anonymity
to commit offences with impunity? Arguably this should not suffice, at
least not to remove anonymity generally. However, as has been argued
elsewhere,43 it may be sufficient to lower the veil of anonymity in
particular cases. Therefore, where a crime has been committed it may be
justifiable to permit the authorities the power to access a key allowing
them to look behind the anonymity, thus permitting them to prosecute or
to prevent further breaches of criminal laws or of national security. In
relation to this it is important to note that anonymity is increasingly an
illusion. The level of anonymity that Internet users enjoy today is, due to
technical changes, considerably lower than it used to be. It may be that
what is necessary is to educate the public about the true situation, thus
discouraging those who participate in anti-social behaviours because they
believe that they are anonymous and therefore likely to escape detection.
The present work is not, however, conclusive. What is really
necessary at this point is not only the risk assessment called for by
Rowland 44 but also extensive research into the effects of anonymity and
its links with harmful behaviours. Lawyers pay far too little attention to
causative links or their absence as found in other disciplines. Where, as
with restrictions on rights, there is a need to assess not only the use and
abuse of particular activities but whether restrictions would deliver the
claimed benefit, there is a need to consider carefully the presence or
absence of causative links between the abuse and the element which may
be restricted. Without this, restrictions of rights should not be permitted,
as the claimed benefits used as justifications for them would not be
43. See, e.g., Akdeniz Yamen et al., BigBrother.gov.uk: State Surveillance in the
Age of Information and Rights, 2001 CRIM. L. REV 73 (2001). See also, Katherine S.
Williams, Facilitating Safer Choices: Use of Warnings to Dissuade Viewing of
Pornography on the Internet, 15 CHILD ABUSE REV. (forthcoming 2006).
44. See Rowland, Anonymity, supra note 9. See also Rowland, Privacy, supra note
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proven. The case to protect anonymity, at least between users, is
strengthened when one takes account of the fact that general removal of
anonymity might actually increase the danger for some of the most
vulnerable users of the world-wide-web.

